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ABSTRACT 
Hedge fund activists are the bright new hope of the shareholder 
empowerment movement. Free from conflicts of interest and with high-
powered compensation incentives, activist hedge funds are shaking up 
corporate boardrooms. The recent surge in activism has provoked criticism 
against activist investors portrayed as short-term agitators seeking to 
obtain short-term profits at the expense of long-term value. Although the 
view of hedge fund activists as short-term speculators has been discredited 
by empirical evidence, innovative tactics employed by hedge funds allow 
them to secretly accumulate large stakes in target companies within a short 
time period. In response to the adverse effects of activist tactics on market 
transparency and fairness, European regulators have tightened disclosure 
obligations for major blockholders, with U.S. regulators following suit. 
While calls for tightening disclosure obligations in the United States have 
been accompanied by a lively debate between proponents and opponents of 
tighter disclosure rules, the amendment of disclosure rules in Europe was 
not preceded by any meaningful empirical analysis of the benefits and costs 
of tighter disclosure rules. The result is that current European disclosure 
rules tilt the balance heavily against activist investors seeking to operate in 
Europe. In line with developments across the other side of the Atlantic, the 
present Article urges European regulators to reconsider the current 
disclosure regime by conducting a careful empirical analysis of their 
benefits for market transparency and fairness and their costs on 
shareholders and companies as a result of a reduction in the incidence of 
activist shareholdings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recent years have seen a tectonic shift in the power struggle between 
corporate insiders and shareholders.1 Shareholder empowerment has even 
led scholars to conclude that the shareholder-manager agency cost problem 
generated by the separation of ownership and control has been largely 
resolved.2 One of the reasons behind this development is the rise of a new 
breed of aggressive shareholder activists: hedge funds. 3  Armed with a 
growing war chest reaching $65.5 billion for U.S. funds and the support of 
proxy advisory firms and traditional institutional investors such as mutual 
                                                                                                                                
 1. See Corporate Governance: Shareholders at the Gates, ECONOMIST, Mar. 9, 2013, at 63, 
available at http://www.economist.com/news/business/21573134-americas-proxy-season-will-pit-
management-against-owners-never-shareholders. Indeed, the number of proxy contests has surged 
from an average of seventeen per year during 1979–94 to fifty-five per year from 1994–2008. See 
Vyacheslav Fos, The Disciplinary Effects of Proxy Contests 1 (Sept. 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1705707. 
 2. See Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1907, 1910 (2013) (claiming that changes in market and corporate practices have brought 
the problem arising out of the separation of ownership and control under control). Berle and 
Means first observed that the separation of ownership and control in modern publicly held 
corporations gives rise to an agency problem as the interests of dispersed shareholder-principals 
and manager-agents diverge. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE 
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, 
Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 301, 304 (1983). Jensen and 
Meckling defined the costs generated by this separation as “agency costs.” Agency costs include 
the costs of monitoring managers by shareholders, the bonding costs incurred by managers, and 
the residual loss incurred by shareholders. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory 
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 
308 (1976). 
 3. See Rock, supra note 2, at 1922. 
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funds and pension funds,4 activist hedge funds are increasing their clout 
inside corporate boardrooms. Household names such as Apple, 
McDonald’s, Wendy’s, and Hess Corporation—previously out of the reach 
of activist investors, who lacked the financial resources to amass a 
sufficiently large stake to influence multibillion-dollar companies—have 
become targets of hedge fund activists, with hedge funds succeeding in 
changing their operational performance or corporate governance.5 
Even though the roots of hedge fund activism can be traced back to the 
corporate raiders and U.S. takeover boom of the 1970s and 1980s,6 and 
although the United States remains the most important market for activists, 
with U.S. funds dominating the global landscape,7 hedge fund activism has 
been spreading in Europe, particularly after 2000.8 Shareholder capitalism 
advocated by hedge funds has been shaking the traditionally insider-
dominated European corporate system. For example, activists have 
demanded the break-up of Dutch financial institution ABN AMRO, 9 
pressured the Italian oil company ENI to restructure its operations, 10 
launched a proxy fight against the management of French multinational 
                                                                                                                                
 4. See Jessica Toonkel & Soyoung Kim, Activist Investors Find Allies in Mutual, Pension 
Funds, REUTERS (Apr. 9, 2013, 11:25 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/09/us-funds-
activist-idUSBRE9380DU20130409. 
 5. See Chris Burritt & Katherine Burton, Bill Ackman Sells McDonald’s Stake After Stock 
Surges, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 5, 2007, 16:08), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid 
=newsarchive&sid=aZ6kcnn5qqUo (reporting activist investor Bill Ackman’s successful pressure 
on McDonald’s to sell assets and increase distributions to shareholders); Michael J. de la Merced, 
How Elliott and Hess Settled a Bitter Proxy Battle, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May 16, 2013, 9:11 
AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/16/hess-and-elliott-settle-fight-over-companys-board/ 
(discussing the proxy battle and eventual settlement between Hess’s management and hedge fund 
Elliott Management); David Englander, Appetizing Change on the Menu, BARRON’S (Feb. 9, 
2013), http://online.barrons.com/article/SB50001424052748704372504578284040427077104 
.html (discussing the transformation of fast food chain Wendy’s under the control of activist 
investor Nelson Peltz); Ben Fox Rubin, Einhorn Sues Apple over Preferred Stock Plan, WALL ST. 
J. (Feb. 7, 2013, 1:47 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10001424127887323452204578289811591849522.html (detailing the pressure exerted by 
activist David Einhorn over Apple to return its huge cash pile to shareholders). 
 6. Corporate raiders such as Carl Icahn, Nelson Peltz, and T. Boone Pickens gained notoriety 
during their heyday in the 1980s for acquiring controlling stakes in undervalued companies, 
aggressively using debt finance and their power to replace boards of directors and force 
companies to break up. See generally KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE 
HOSTILE TAKEOVER (John C. Coffee et al. eds., 1988). 
 7. Shareholder Activism Review 2012, ACTIVIST INSIGHT, 1 (Jan. 2013), 
http://www.activistinsight.com/research/Activist%20Insight%20-%20Annual%20Activism% 
20Review%202012.pdf. 
 8. See Europe’s Revolting Shareholders, ECONOMIST, May 12, 2001, at 63, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/620394. 
 9. Hedge Fund Calls for Break-Up of ABN Amro, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 21, 2007, 
7:43 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2007/02/21/hedge-fund-calls-for-break-up-of-abn-amro/. 
 10. Liam Moloney & Benoît Faucon, Activist Investor Says Eni Breakup Would Add Value, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 3, 2009, 11:59 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125192824412581143 
.html. 
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Atos,11 and succeeded in blocking Deutsche Boerse’s attempts to take over 
the London Stock Exchange and oust its CEO.12 
The recent surge and growing success of hedge fund activism13 have 
provoked a backlash against activism from influential corporate lawyers,14 
legal academics, 15  politicians, 16  business journalists, 17  and prominent 
judges.18 Activists have been criticized as short-term speculators destroying 
long-term value and compromising market transparency by exploiting 
archaic disclosure rules allowing them to secretly accumulate influential 
stakes in target companies,19 decoupling economic ownership from voting 
rights through the use of derivatives. 20 In response to a petition filed by                                                                                                                                 
 11. Dana Cimilluca, Chaos Surrounds Atos, WALL ST. J. (May 23, 2008, 12:01 AM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121149152806915431.html. 
 12. For an excellent overview of this landmark shareholder revolution and its implications for 
German corporate governance, see Sudi Sudarsanam & Tim Broadhurst, Corporate Governance 
Convergence in Germany Through Shareholder Activism: Impact of the Deutsche Boerse Bid for 
London Stock Exchange, 16 J. MGMT. & GOV. 235 (2012). 
 13. See Toonkel & Kim, supra note 4. 
 14. See Martin Lipton, Bite the Apple; Poison the Apple; Paralyze the Company; Wreck the 
Economy, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 26, 2013, 9:22 AM), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/02/26/bite-the-apple-poison-the-apple-paralyze-the-
company-wreck-the-economy/. 
 15. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 1255 (2008). 
 16. Franz Müntefering, an influential German politician, famously described hedge funds as 
“swarms of locusts that fall on companies, stripping them bare before moving on.” See Locust, 
Pocus—German Capitalism, ECONOMIST, May 7, 2005, at 75, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/3935994. 
 17. Ira M. Millstein, Re-Examining Board Priorities in an Era of Activism, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Mar. 8, 2013, 3:52 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/re-examining-
board-priorities-in-an-era-of-activism/; Andrew Ross Sorkin, Shareholder Democracy Can Mask 
Abuses, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 25, 2013, 9:30 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02 
/25/shareholder-democracy-can-mask-abuses/. 
 18. See Jack Jacobs, Patient Capital: Can Delaware Corporate Law Help Revive It?, 68 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645 (2011); Leo E. Strine, One Fundamental Corporate Governance 
Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful 
Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1 (2010). 
 19. Martin Lipton, Important Questions About Activist Hedge Funds, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 9, 2013, 10:10 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu 
/corpgov/2013/03/09/important-questions-about-activist-hedge-funds/. 
 20. See Beneficial Ownership of Equity Derivatives and Short Positions—A Modest Proposal 
to Bring the 13D Reporting System into the 21st Century, WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ 
(Mar. 3, 2008), http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.15395 
.08.pdf [hereinafter Beneficial Ownership]. Henry Hu and Bernard Black were the first to explore 
and conceptualize the phenomenon of equity and risk decoupling. Pursuant to Hu and Black, risk 
and equity decoupling can be broken down into “empty voting” and “hidden (morphable) 
ownership.” Empty voting refers to a situation where a person has greater voting than economic 
ownership. In contrast, any person who has greater economic than voting ownership is referred to 
as a “hidden owner” and his or her ownership as “hidden ownership.” See Henry T. C. Hu & 
Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 811, 812 (2006); Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling 
and Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625 (2008); Henry T. C. Hu 
& Bernard Black, Hedge Funds, Insiders and the Decoupling of Economic and Voting Ownership: 
Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 343 (2007). 
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prominent U.S. law firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz voicing the 
abovementioned concerns,21 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(the SEC) is currently considering the amendment and modernization of 
disclosure requirements for outside blockholders. 22  Opponents of the 
petition point to the beneficial role of outside blockholders and especially 
activist hedge funds, warn about the chilling effect of the amendments on 
activism, and call on the SEC to carefully balance their costs and benefits.23 
Across the Atlantic, individual European countries have already tightened 
their disclosure rules for major shareholders, with the European 
Commission having recently adopted amendments to Directive 
2004/109/EC (the Directive or Transparency Directive) governing 
disclosure of major shareholdings.24 Alarmed by the activities of activists, 
European regulators hastily tightened disclosure rules for outside 
blockholders without considering the beneficial effects of activist investors 
and the crucial role that disclosure requirements play in incentivizing 
outside blockholders. As Gilson and Gordon have argued, current European 
and U.S. legislative developments alike should be understood as efforts to 
impose a novel defensive mechanism at a time when activists are gaining 
increased support by institutional investors.25 
The aim of this Article is to offer a critique against the current 
European disclosure rules for major shareholdings for failing to adequately 
balance on the one hand the beneficial effects of activism and the adverse                                                                                                                                 
 21. Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Mar. 7, 
2011) [hereinafter Letter from Wachtell, Lipton], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions 
/2011/petn4-624.pdf. 
 22. See Beneficial Ownership Reporting, OFF. INFO. & REG. AFF. (Oct. 2013), 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201210&RIN=3235-AK42. 
Blockholders who amass a stake of above five percent of voting rights and intend to actively 
influence the governance of the target are required to file a Schedule 13D with the SEC. The 
information contained in a Schedule 13D filing includes a declaration of intentions by the 
shareholder crossing the threshold. The blockholder must describe the purpose of the acquisition 
of shares of the issuer and any plans that would result in certain extraordinary transactions such as 
a merger, reorganization, liquidation of the issuer, a sale of a material amount of assets of the 
issuer, a change in the dividend policy of the issuer, and any plans to change the composition of 
its board of directors. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2014); Schedule 13D, SEC, 
https://www.sec.gov/answers/sched13.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2014).  
 23.  Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of Blockholder 
Disclosure, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39, 59–60 (2012). 
 24. Council Directive 2013/50/EU, 2013 O.J. (L 294) [hereinafter Transparency Directive 
Amendments]; Council Directive 2004/109/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
15 December 2004 on the Harmonization of Transparency Requirements in Relation to 
Information about Issuers Whose Securities Are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and 
Amending Directive 2001/34/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 390) [hereinafter Harmonization of Transparency 
Directive]. 
 25. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist 
Investors and the Reevaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 904–05, 907, 
911–12 (2013); see also Matteo Erede, Governing Corporations with Concentrated Ownership 
Structure: An Empirical Analysis of Hedge Fund Activism in Italy and Germany, and Its 
Evolution, 10 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 328, 339–40 (2013). 
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impact of tighter disclosure rules on it and on the other hand the need for 
safeguarding market transparency. Part I examines the key role that hedge 
funds play in modern capital markets and corporate governance and 
describes the demands and tactics used by activists to achieve their goals. 
Part II explores the promises and perils of hedge fund activism. Empirical 
studies have documented the beneficial effects of hedge fund activism on 
corporate governance and performance, casting doubt on the popular image 
of activists as short-term agitators. Nonetheless, the tactics used by activists 
to accumulate their stakes often compromise market transparency and 
fairness. Part III explains the crucial role that disclosure rules play in 
incentivizing hedge funds to engage in activism and critiques the current 
European disclosure regimes as failing to adequately balance the beneficial 
effects of activism against the need to enhance market transparency. In line 
with calls by U.S. academics stressing the necessity of empirical analysis 
before proceeding with the tightening of disclosure obligation for major 
blockholders in the United States, Part III also urges European regulators to 
reconsider the current disclosure obligations imposed on activist 
shareholders and conduct a careful empirical analysis of the benefits and 
costs of tighter disclosure obligations.26  
I.  HEDGE FUND ACTIVISTS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
A.  HEDGE FUNDS AS GOVERNANCE ARBITRAGEURS27 
Modern shareholder activism began in the United States during the 
1970s and 1980s, with individual investors such as Carl Icahn and Nelson 
Peltz amassing controlling positions and aggressively agitating for actions 
that would grant them short-term gains. 28  Faced with collective action 
problems, however, individual shareholders largely abstained from 
becoming involved in corporate governance. 29  With the U.S. hostile 
takeover wave fading away in the late 1980s,30 attention turned to the other                                                                                                                                 
 26. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 23, at 59–60.  
 27. The term “governance arbitrageurs” was coined by Gilson & Gordon, supra note 25, at 
896. 
 28.  See generally KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS, supra note 6. 
 29. Two related problems make shareholders passive and rationally apathetic in widely held 
firms. First, while a shareholder who wishes to become involved in corporate governance must 
bear the costs of its efforts, including monitoring costs and the costs of launching a proxy 
campaign, it receives only a pro rata share of the gains if its actions are successful, allowing other 
shareholders to free-ride on its efforts. Second, knowing that its vote will not affect the outcome, 
an individual shareholder does not have an incentive to carefully consider a proposal submitted to 
a vote. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 63–89 (1991); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. 
L. REV. 520, 526–30 (1990). 
 30. The U.S. takeover boom lasted from 1984 until 1989 and was characterized by a surge in 
hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts. See PATRICK GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND 
CORPORATE RESTRUCTURINGS 57–63 (5th ed. 2011). Hostile takeovers were viewed as the 
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powerful players in capital markets: institutional investors, and most 
prominently, mutual funds and pension funds. 31  It was argued that 
institutional investors as outside blockholders had the incentives to engage 
in monitoring and intervene in the companies in which they invested.32 
Nonetheless, the promise remained unfulfilled. Nearly two decades 
afterwards, researchers concluded that the impact of institutional investors 
on corporate governance and performance was negligible.33 
Legal barriers, conflicts of interest, and a business model fundamentally 
incompatible with activism make institutional investor intervention 
“incidental” and “ex post.”34 Regulatory constraints include diversification                                                                                                                                 
ultimate disciplinary mechanism against managerial incompetence and self-interest. See Henry G. 
Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 113 (1965). 
Multiple factors contributed to the end of the takeover boom, including the economic slowdown 
starting in 1989; the collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert, an investment bank specialized in 
financing takeovers; the enactment of anti-takeover statutes by state legislatures; and the 
endorsement of takeover defenses by the courts of the state of Delaware, where the majority of 
public corporations have been incorporated following a series of landmark court decisions. See 
Steven M. Davidoff, Takeover Theory and the Law and Economics Movement, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW 216 (Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell eds., 
2012). 
 31. Bernard S. Black, Agent Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 
UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside 
Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1990). Institutional 
investors and especially mutual funds and pension funds have come to dominate modern capital 
markets. In 2009, over 50% of U.S. public equities were held by institutional investors. See 
Matteo Tonello & Stephan Rabimov, The 2010 Institutional Investment Report: Trends in Asset 
Allocation and Portfolio Composition 22 tbl.10 (Conference Bd., Research Report No. R-1468-
10-RR, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1707512. Institutional ownership is also 
prevalent in the United Kingdom, reaching 80% of listed equities and rapidly spreading in 
continental Europe, reaching for instance 25% in Italy and 29% in Germany. See Paolo Santella et 
al., A Comparative Analysis of the Legal Obstacles to Institutional Investor Activism in the EU 
and in the US 12 (July 2, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1137491. 
 32. A large shareholder is able to spread the costs associated with monitoring and intervention 
over a larger share and capture higher gains from its intervention. Furthermore, its substantial 
voting rights allow it to pressure and potentially remove management through a proxy fight or 
takeover. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. 
POL. ECON. 461, 461 (1986); Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, A Survey of Corporate 
Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 754 (1997). 
 33. As a legal academic concluded in 1998, “[t]he evidence to date suggests that activism, 
American style, has had little effect on firm performance.” See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder 
Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY 
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 459 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). Similarly, in their survey of 
empirical studies regarding institutional shareholder activism, Gillan and Starks conclude that 
activism has little impact on improving long-term stock performance or the operating performance 
of targeted companies. See Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder 
Activism in the United States, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 2007, at 55. In their examination of 
shareholder proposals submitted in Europe, Cziraki, Renneboog, and Szilagyi find that proposal 
submissions are rare in Europe and are associated with negative market reactions. See Peter 
Cziraki et al., Shareholder Activism Through the Proxy Proposals: The European Perspective, 16 
EUR. FIN. MGMT. 738 (2010). 
 34. Traditional institutional investor activism seeks to safeguard the value of pre-existing 
investments. Thus, institutional investors will engage in activism only in case a company already 
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requirements for mutual and pension funds35 and requirements for daily 
liquidity for open-ended mutual fund investors,36 inhibiting their ability to 
invest in large illiquid positions. Conflicts of interest are particularly severe 
for pension funds, with public pension funds subject to political pressure 
and private pension fund managers seeking to obtain and maintain business 
from their corporate clients. 37  The fundamental explanation for the 
reluctance of mutual and pension funds to invest in activism is their 
business model, which prioritizes the quest for relative returns.38 Mutual 
fund and pension fund managers are judged against their performance 
relative to their peers.39 A manager engaging in activism must bear all of 
the costs of the effort while sharing the gains with its competitors who hold 
shares in the target company. 40 As a result, the manager’s performance 
relative to its competitors will decline. Thus, even though activism would 
increase the value of the company and benefit beneficiaries, managers are 
hesitant to engage in it. 
It is this governance shortfall that hedge funds as governance 
arbitrageurs seek to exploit. With institutional investors paralyzed and 
unable to invest in profitable activism, activists specialize in searching for                                                                                                                                 
part of the institution’s portfolio is either underperforming or in need of a shake-up in its corporate 
governance. See Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder 
Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 52, 56 (2011); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge 
Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1069 (2007). 
 35. For instance, the Investment Company Act of 1940 prohibits mutual funds that wish to 
advertise themselves as diversified from putting more than 5% of their regulated assets in the 
securities of any one issuer and including in the regulated part of their portfolios more than 10% 
of the stock of any company. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b) (2012). Similarly, by virtue of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), private pension funds are required 
to be diversified. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104; see also Mark Roe, A Political Theory of American 
Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 19–21, 24–25 (1991) (summarizing the various 
diversification limits imposed on U.S. mutual funds and private pension funds). Similar 
requirements are imposed for EU mutual funds by the Undertakings for Collective Investments in 
Transferable Securities Directive (UCITS Directive). See, e.g., Directive 2009/65/EC, of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the Coordination of Laws, 
Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to Undertakings for Collective Investment in 
Transferable Securities (UCITS), art. 52 § 1(a), 2009 O.J. (L 302), 32, 63 [hereinafter UCITS 
Directive] (prohibiting mutual funds from investing more than 5% of their assets in shares of the 
same issuer). For individual European countries’ regulations regarding diversification 
requirements for pension funds, see ORG. FOR ECON. DEV. & COOPERATION, ANNUAL SURVEY 
OF INVESTMENT REGULATION OF PENSION FUNDS (2013), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/private-pensions/InvRegPensionFunds2013.pdf.  
 36. For European regulations, see UCITS Directive, supra note 35, art. 1 § 2(b); for U.S. 
regulations, see 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(1). 
 37. For an excellent investigation of the conflicts of interests plaguing institutional investors, 
see Black, supra note 29, at 595–608. 
 38. JOHN KAY, THE KAY REVIEW OF UK EQUITY MARKETS AND LONG-TERM DECISION 
MAKING: FINAL REPORT 39–42 (2012), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads 
/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/253454/bis-12-917-kay-review-of-equity-markets-final-
report.pdf. 
 39. See id. at 42. 
 40. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 25, at 890–93. 
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undervalued41 and poorly governed firms and agitating for operational or 
governance improvements as outside blockholders. Unconstrained by 
restrictive regulation, 42  with high-powered performance incentives 43  and 
free of conflicts of interest, hedge funds are able to amass large illiquid 
positions falling short of control blocks and typically below ten percent of 
target stock,44 engaging in costly and time-consuming efforts to propose 
and aid in the implementation of changes in target companies.45 In contrast 
to traditional institutional investor activism, hedge funds invest in order to 
engage in activism. 46  Their activism, therefore, is “strategic” and “ex 
ante.”47 Belonging to the group of value investors,48 hedge fund activists                                                                                                                                 
 41. See Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm 
Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1741 (2008); Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism: A Review, 4 
FOUND. & TRENDS FIN. 185 (2009) (finding that activists target firms with low market values 
relative to their book values). 
 42. Hedge funds are not subject to any diversification requirements, allowing them to 
concentrate their investments in a limited number of influential positions in target companies. The 
recent surge in assets under management has allowed activists to amass influential stakes in ever-
bigger companies. See Anupreeta Das & Sharon Terlep, Activist Fights Draw More Attention, 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 18, 2013, 11:23 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10001424127887324392804578360370704215446.html. Furthermore, in contrast to open-
ended mutual funds, hedge fund managers grant investors limited withdrawal rights. Activist 
funds lock up investor capital for an initial period of eighteen months to two years, with several 
funds adopting longer lock-ups. See Azam Ahmed, For Activist Funds, a Long-Term Approach to 
Investing, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Dec. 20, 2010, 7:45 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010 
/12/20/for-activist-funds-a-long-term-approach-to-investing/; David Nissenbaum & Maria 
Gabriela Bianchini, Activist Fund Structuring, SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL LLP, 2 (2005), 
http://www.srz.com/files/News/dc23f4b9-405a-429e-be30-793a1098068a/Presentation 
/NewsAttachment/71f8978a-ad95-4fef-b535-8629c46fe223/filesfilesai-spring-05-nissenbaum.pdf. 
Furthermore, hedge funds allow investor withdrawals only during a quarterly or semiannual 
redemption period and after prior notice. Other mechanisms that hedge funds utilize to ensure 
liquidity are gates on withdrawals, which limit the amount that can be withdrawn during any 
redemption period to a specified percentage of the fund’s capital. Additionally, activists often 
place illiquid investments in companies in a side pocket account. Investors are not allowed to 
withdraw their capital from the side pocket until the investment is liquidated. See DAVID P. 
STOWELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO INVESTMENT BANKS, HEDGE FUNDS AND PRIVATE EQUITY: 
THE NEW PARADIGM 213–14 (2010). 
 43. While mutual funds are compensated on the basis of the assets under management, hedge 
fund compensation consists of both a management fee, ranging from one to two percent of the 
assets under management, and an incentive fee, usually set at twenty percent of the fund’s profits 
and widely known as “carried interest.” Carried interest creates a powerful incentive for hedge 
funds to seek absolute performance. See Ludwig Chincarini, Hedge Funds—An Introduction, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HEDGE FUNDS, PRIVATE EQUITY AND ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS 
13, 24 (Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell eds., 2012).  
 44. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence 
and Policy, 39 J. CORP. L. 1, 12 (2013) (examining all 13D filings by activist hedge funds in the 
United States from 1994 until 2007 and finding that activists acquire an average stake of 8.8% and 
median of 6.3%). 
 45. See infra note 158. 
 46. Cheffins & Armour, supra note 34. 
 47. Kahan & Rock, supra note 34. 
 48. Activists hold relatively few concentrated positions in target companies and rarely hedge 
their positions. Their managers and employees are usually former investment bankers and research 
analysts accustomed to fundamental analysis. The crucial difference between hedge fund activists 
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conduct diligent research with the aim of spotting targets that will benefit 
from intervention and identify the changes that will unlock shareholder 
value.49 The most common propositions of activists are a sale of the target, 
return of excess cash,50 sale or spin-offs of unrelated assets and refocusing 
corporate strategy, 51 improvements in firm governance,52 and changes in 
the target’s long-term business plan.53 
B.  GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS: VOICE OR EXIT? 
1.  Voice 
In his landmark treatise, Hirschman emphasized that members of an 
organization, be it a firm, a nation, or any other collective, have two options 
when faced with a deterioration in the quality of the organization: either 
exit, namely through withdrawal from the organization, or voice their 
dissatisfaction and attempt to remedy the flaws in the organization by 
communicating their own proposals.54 It is for their ability to exercise voice 
instead of selling their shares and voting with their feet by following the 
practice known as the “Wall Street Walk” that hedge funds have been 
praised. 
Gantchev models hedge fund activism as a sequential process with 
three different stages: demand negotiations, board representation, and proxy                                                                                                                                 
and value investors, such as Warren Buffett, is their willingness to adopt an aggressive stance 
against target management who refuse to implement their propositions. See William W. Bratton, 
Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1383 (2007). 
 49. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 25, at 902. 
 50. Michael Jensen famously pointed to the agency costs generated by free cash flow, namely 
cash flow in excess of that required for financing all positive net present value projects. Managers 
will waste free cash flow in suboptimal projects or hold it on the firm’s balance sheet, insulating 
themselves from the discipline of capital markets. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free 
Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986). Indeed, 
empirical studies confirm that firms targeted by activists tend to be profitable but low-growth 
firms with healthy operating cash flow and low payouts to shareholders. See Brav et al., Hedge 
Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, supra note 41, at 1753. 
 51. Deconglomerization gained traction during the 1970s and 1980s after the abysmal 
performance of conglomerates created during the 1960s. A variety of studies have shown that 
conglomerates are associated with a “diversification discount” reaching fifteen percent. See Philip 
G. Berger & Eli Ofek, Diversification’s Effect on Firm Value, 37 J. FIN. ECON. 39, 59–60 (1995); 
Henri Servaes, The Value of Diversification During the Conglomerate Merger Wave, 51 J. FIN. 
1201 (1996). Apart from demanding the break-up of conglomerates, activists also advocate the 
sale or spin-off of unessential and underperforming divisions of a multidivisional firm operating in 
a single industry. See Bratton, supra note 48, at 1392–93. 
 52. Increasingly, activists are demanding the dismantling of takeover defenses with the ardent 
support of mainstream institutional investors. See Matteo Tonello, Poison Pills in 2011, HARV. L. 
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (April 3, 2011, 9:49 AM), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/04/03/poison-pills-in-2011/. 
 53. See Bratton, supra note 48, at 1390–97; Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate 
Governance and Firm Performance, supra note 41, at 1741–44. 
 54. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO 
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
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fight.55 An activism campaign begins with the filing of a regulatory form 
announcing the crossing of a specified ownership threshold and the 
intentions of the activist. 56 Then follows the demand negotiations stage, 
where the activist communicates its demands and negotiates directly with 
management. 57  If its demands are rejected, the activist requests board 
representation and threatens to launch a proxy fight.58 If management still 
resists, then the activist moves to the final and most aggressive stage: the 
commencement of a proxy fight. 59  Crucially, the activist lacking a 
controlling position in the target has to gather the support of other 
shareholders—mainly institutional investors.60 As Gilson and Gordon note, 
after publicly announcing its presence, the activist will start a nonpublic 
campaign seeking to convince institutional investors to support its 
demands. 61  Thus, the activist will move from a less to a more 
confrontational stage only after it makes a positive assessment about the 
likelihood of support from traditional institutional investors, with the last 
stage—a proxy fight—being in essence an official referendum on the 
activist’s proposals.62 
2.  Exit 
While exit has been treated as an alternative to activism exercised 
through voice and therefore inconsistent with it, 63  a recent strand of 
academic research has recognized exit as another powerful governance                                                                                                                                 
 55. Nickolay Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Sequential 
Decision Model, 107 J. FIN. ECON. 610, 613–14 (2013). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. Activists targeting continental European companies, which are often controlled by 
majority shareholders, tend to cooperate with controlling shareholders. Furthermore, the 
engagement is usually private, with the proxy fight stage being infrequent. See Marco Becht et al., 
The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study 3 (Eur. Corporate Governance Inst., 
Working Paper No. 098/2008, 2013), available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/schools 
/csom_sites/finance/Franks-031313b.pdf. 
 58. Gantchev, supra note 55. 
 59. Id. at 614. 
 60. See Ruth Sullivan, Traditional Investors Adopt Activism, FIN. TIMES (May 5, 2013, 6:14 
AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/62d5ea16-b253-11e2-a388-00144feabdc0.html. Institutional 
ownership in the top 1000 U.S. corporations has reached an average of seventy-three percent. See 
Tonello & Rabimov, supra note 31. 
 61. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 25, at 899–901. Indeed, Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas 
find that activists tend to target companies with high institutional ownership. See Brav et al., 
Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, supra note 41, at 1753. 
 62. Management will also make the same assessment in deciding whether to accept or reject 
the activist’s demands. See Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm 
Performance, supra note 41, at 1764. 
 63. See, e.g., John Coffee, Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate 
Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991) (arguing that liquidity impairs activism and voice by 
making it easier for institutional investors to immediately sell their shares and follow the “Wall 
Street Walk”); see also IRIS H-Y CHIU, THE FOUNDATIONS AND ANATOMY OF SHAREHOLDER 
ACTIVISM 7 (2010); see generally Amar Bhide, The Hidden Costs of Stock Market Liquidity, 34 J. 
FIN. ECON. 31 (1993). 
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mechanism.64 Sales of stock by dissatisfied blockholders hurt the manager 
that has a substantial amount of its compensation tied to stock price 
performance65 ex post by lowering stock prices and consequently its wealth. 
Ex ante, the threat of exit plays a disciplinary role by inducing the manager 
to enhance firm value. 66  In contrast with previous literature that treats 
liquidity as harmful for impairing activism by making exit easier,67 viewing 
exit as a governance mechanism implies that liquidity is in fact beneficial. 
First, liquidity encourages initial block formation by allowing a blockholder 
to buy additional shares without causing any price impact. 68  Second, it 
facilitates more trading by blockholders and consequently strengthens 
governance through exit.69 Indeed, Edmans, Fang, and Zur, using a sample 
of activist hedge fund block acquisitions from 1995 to 2010, find that 
liquidity increases the likelihood of block acquisition.70 Although it reduces 
the likelihood that the activist files a Schedule 13D rather than a 13G, thus 
inhibiting voice, liquidity encourages governance through exit. 71 
Confirming the governance role of exit, they find that the filing of a 13G is 
                                                                                                                                
 64. See, e.g., Anat. R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The “Wall Street Walk” and Shareholder 
Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2445 (2009); Alex Edmans, Blockholder 
Trading, Market Efficiency and Managerial Myopia, 64 J. FIN. 2481 (2009); Alex Edmans & 
Gustavo Manso, Governance Through Trading and Intervention: A Theory of Multiple 
Blockholders, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 2395 (2011). 
 65. The rise of pay-for performance can be traced back to the 1980s and recognition of the 
powerful role that equity-based compensation plays in incentivizing managers to act in the 
shareholders’ interests. See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-
Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990). It is now an indisputable fact that a 
substantial amount of executive compensation is either granted in stock and stock options or is 
equity-linked. See Martin J. Conyon et al., The Executive Compensation Controversy—A 
Transatlantic Analysis 47 (Inst. for Compensation Studies, Working Paper No. 002, 2011), 
available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ics/5/ (finding that at the end of 2006, the 
median U.S. CEO held stock and options worth 9.7 times his or her cash compensation, with the 
ratio for European CEOs being 4.4). 
 66. Alex Edmans, Blockholders and Corporate Governance 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 19573, 2013), available at http://www.nber.org/papers 
/w19573.pdf. 
 67. See LESTER THUROW, HEAD TO HEAD: THE COMING ECONOMICS BATTLE AMONG 
JAPAN, EUROPE AND AMERICA (1993); Coffee, supra note 63; Michael Porter, Capital 
Disadvantage: America’s Failing Capital Investment System, 70 HARV. BUS. REV. 65 (1992). 
 68. Ernst Maug, Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Tradeoff Between Liquidity and 
Control?, 53 J. FIN. 65 (1998). 
 69. Alex Edmans et al., The Effect of Liquidity on Governance, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 1443, 
1444 (2013). 
 70. Id. at 1457–60. 
 71. The effect is especially strong for firms with high managerial incentives. See id. at 1460–
61. A Schedule 13D is filed by a blockholder who intends to become active in the governance of 
the company, while a Schedule 13G is filed by a blockholder who holds the securities as passive 
investment and does not intend to change or influence control over the issuer. See 17 C.F.R.  
§ 240.13d-1 (2014). 
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associated with positive abnormal returns around the filing date and 
improved operating performance after the filing.72 
II.  THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM 
A.  THE PROMISE OF HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM 
Law and finance literature has univocally recognized the benefits of 
large outside blockholders, and especially activist hedge funds, in 
improving corporate governance and operational performance of target 
companies.73 By amassing a large stake, blockholders are able to spread the 
costs of their activism and reap higher gains from their efforts. 74 
Consequently, blockholders are sufficiently incentivized to gather costly 
information, engage in monitoring, and invest in activism. Ex post, a 
blockholder will discipline management for suboptimal performance. Ex 
ante, the threat of a blockholder acquiring a stake motivates management to 
exert greater efforts and improve performance.75 Crucially, the gains from 
monitoring or successful intervention will be reaped by all shareholders of 
the target company.76 It is here where modern activists diverge from the 
“raiders” of the 1980s, who sought to take control of the company, then 
strip it of its assets or convince the company to buy back their stock at a 
large market premium, keeping the gains solely for themselves.77 What is 
more, in cases of corporations dominated by controlling shareholders where 
the agency cost shifts from being one between managers and shareholders 
to one between controlling and minority shareholders,78 activist initiatives                                                                                                                                 
 72. Edmans et al., supra note 69, at 1461–66. The stock price spike represents the market’s 
anticipation of governance benefits from the presence of a blockholder who can exert governance 
through exit. This anticipation is confirmed by subsequent improved operating performance.  
 73. See generally Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism: A Review, supra note 41.  
 74. Shleifer & Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, supra note 32; Shleifer & 
Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, supra note 32, at 753–54. 
 75. Bebchuk et al., supra note 44, at 12. 
 76. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 23, at 50. 
 77. See John Coffee, supra note 63. The practice of greenmail by “raiders” was prevalent 
during the takeover wars of the 1980s. Raiders would buy a large stake in the target company and 
under the threat of a hostile takeover coerce the target into buying back the raiders’ stake at a 
substantial premium to the market price without extending the offer to all target shareholders. See 
David Manry & David Stangeland, Greenmail: A Brief History, 6 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 217, 222 
(2001). 
 78. In a concentrated ownership structure, the controlling shareholder will have both the 
incentives and the power to discipline management and minimize the agency costs between 
shareholders and management. However, the controlling shareholder will have its own interests 
and may use its control rights in order to expropriate other shareholders. See REINIER R. 
KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH 22 (2004); Shleifer & Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, supra note 32, at 
758. The standard narrative views the dispersed ownership model prevailing in the United States 
and United Kingdom as the exception, with concentrated ownership being the rule around the 
world and especially in Continental Europe. See Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership 
Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999) (the seminal paper on this topic). Nonetheless, this view 
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are aimed at curbing private benefit extraction by controlling 
shareholders. 79  Hedge fund activists seek to discipline controlling 
shareholders by cooperating with fellow minority shareholders and utilizing 
the protective tools granted by the legal regime to minority shareholders.80 
Consistent with the theory that highlights the beneficial role of activists 
for shareholders, various studies have univocally documented significant 
positive abnormal returns upon the announcement of the presence of an 
activist hedge fund.81 The price increase reflects the market’s expectation of                                                                                                                                 
of the world is rather outdated. The spread of globalization, the liberalization of capital flows, the 
rise of institutional investors, and regulatory changes have fundamentally transformed corporate 
structures in Continental Europe. For instance, Germany, once considered a hallmark of 
concentrated ownership, is increasingly moving towards a dispersed ownership structure. 
According to the Federal Agency for Public Education, German companies included in the DAX-
30 index and representing Germany’s thirty largest companies by market capitalization exhibit an 
average free-floating share capital of 82.6%. See Aktionärsstruktur von DAX-Unternehmen, 
BUNDESZENTRALE FÜR POLITISCHE BILDUNG (Sept. 25, 2010), http://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen 
/zahlen-und-fakten/globalisierung/52596/aktionaersstruktur-dax. For similar changes in the French 
corporate governance model, see Michel Goyer & Dong Kwan Jung, Diversity of Institutional 
Investors and Foreign Blockholdings in France: The Evolution of an Institutionally Hybrid 
Economy, 19 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 562 (2011); Michel Goyer, The Transformation of 
Corporate Governance in France, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Jan. 2003), 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2003/1/01france%20goyer/goyer.pdf. 
 79. The term “private benefits of control” refers to some value that is enjoyed exclusively by 
the controlling shareholders and is not shared with other shareholders. Alexander Dyck & Luigi 
Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison, 59 J. FIN. 537, 537–41 
(2004). One can distinguish between pecuniary and non-pecuniary private benefits of control. 
Pecuniary private benefits involve the extraction or shifting of real resources from the company to 
the controlling shareholder. Apart from outright theft consumption, pecuniary benefits can take 
the form of related-party transactions, consumption of perquisites, or dilution of minority 
shareholder interests. Non-pecuniary benefits, such as the social status achieved by the control of 
a large corporation, are a form of psychic benefits that involve no real transfer of company 
resources. See Pierre-Henri Conac et al., Constraining Dominant Shareholders’ Self-Dealing: The 
Legal Framework in France, Germany, and Italy, 4 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 491, 495–96 
(2007); Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the 
Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1663–64 (2006).  
 80. See Massimo Belcredi & Luca Enriques, Institutional Investor Activism in a Context of 
Concentrated Ownership and High Private Benefits of Control: The Case of Italy 22–31 (Eur. 
Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 225/2013, 2014), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2325421 (documenting instances where hedge fund activists have sought 
to curb the extraction of private benefits in Italian companies typically controlled by a major 
shareholder). Activists have cooperated with other minority shareholders and utilized the legal 
tools available in the Italian legal regime for the protection of minority shareholders. The demands 
of hedge funds have ranged from changes in the company strategy, to suggesting or opposing 
specific transactions and pushing for alteration of the financial structure or dividend policy of 
firms. Id. 
 81. A large body of empirical work has firmly documented the initial price spike. In their 
study of over 2000 activist interventions in the United States from 1994–2007, Bebchuk, Brav, 
and Jiang find large average abnormal returns approximately 6% in a forty-day window around 
the filing of a Schedule 13D announcing the presence of an activist hedge funds. See Lucian A. 
Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Activism 16 (Columbia Bus. Sch., Research Paper No. 
13-66, 2013), available at http://www.columbia.edu/~wj2006/HF_LTEffects.pdf. Similar results 
are reached by other studies; see Brav et al., supra note 41, at 1729 (finding average abnormal 
returns between 7–8% for activist interventions in the United States); Robin Greenwood & 
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improved firm value resulting from the activist’s involvement, adjusted for 
the probability of success of its campaign.82 Opponents of activism view the 
initial price spike as a result of inefficient market pricing that fails to 
incorporate the long-term costs of activism.83 Therefore, one should expect 
the positive disclosure abnormal returns to be followed by negative long-
term stock returns, making shareholders worse off. Nonetheless, in their 
comprehensive study of activist interventions in the United States from 
1994–2007, Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang examine stock returns in the five 
years after the initial stock price increase and during the three-year period 
following the activist’s exit, documenting no such pattern of negative 
returns reversing the initial positive abnormal returns.84 
The market’s expectation of increased firm value resulting from the 
activist’s intervention is largely confirmed by subsequent improvements in 
operational performance.85 The study by Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang, using as 
performance metrics the Return on Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s q, documents 
that activists target companies whose operating performance at the time of 
intervention trails that of their industry peers or their own historical levels.86                                                                                                                                 
Michael Schor, Investor Activism and Takeovers, 92 J. FIN. ECON. 362 (2009) (examining 
activism in the United States and documenting average abnormal returns around 3.5% over a 
fifteen-day window); April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge 
Funds and Other Private Investors, 64 J. FIN. 187 (examining confrontational activist 
interventions in the United States and documenting returns reaching 10.2% around a 13D filing). 
Large abnormal returns have been documented for activist interventions in Europe as well. See 
Marco Becht et al., Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of the 
Hermes UK Focus Fund, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3094 (2009) (examining activist interventions from 
the Hermes UK Focus Fund and finding positive abnormal returns around the announcement of 
changes following the engagement); Marco Becht et al., Hedge Fund Activism in Europe (Eur. 
Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 283/2010, 2010), available at 
http://www.ecgi.org/tcgd/2011/documents/Becht-Franks-Grant%20Hedge%20Fund%20Activism 
%20in%20Europe%202010.pdf (analyzing a database of European activist interventions and 
finding mean abnormal returns of 4.4% around the disclosure date); see also Bebchuk et al., 
supra, at 19–20 (examining a large database of shareholder activist interventions in North 
America, Europe, and Japan and finding disclosure abnormal returns around 7.5%). 
 82. Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, supra 
note 41, at 1757. 
 83. See Lipton, supra note 19. 
 84. See Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Activism, supra note 81. Indeed, studies have 
found that the market not only correctly anticipates initial gains from intervention, but that it 
actually undervalues the benefits conferred by activism and the probability of its success as well. 
See Bebchuk et al., supra note 81, at 20–23; Greenwood & Schor, supra note 81, at 366–68. 
 85. Although many doubt the expertise and skill of hedge fund activist managers in improving 
operations, one should note that directors nominated on a target’s board by activists are 
predominantly successful executives having expertise in the relevant industry. See, e.g., Michael J. 
de la Merced, Yahoo Shakes Up Its Board and Adds PayPal Co-Founder, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK 
(Dec. 13, 2012, 10:38 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/13/yahoo-said-to-plan-board-
shake-up-adding-levchin/ (discussing activist Daniel Loeb’s push for including experienced 
executives on Yahoo’s board and executive positions); de la Merced, supra note 5 (reporting 
Elliott’s proxy fight with Hess’s management and the profile of Elliott’s slate consisting of 
experienced, former high-level executives). 
 86. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Activism, supra note 81, at 7–13. 
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Indeed, targets experience a constant decline in operating performance 
during the three years prior to the engagement.87 However, they markedly 
outperform their peers during the five years following the intervention, with 
operating performance exceeding the intervention-year level in each year.88 
The beneficial effects of activism are corroborated by Brav, Jiang, and Kim, 
who use data about the performance of U.S. manufacturing plants owned by 
firms targeted by hedge fund activists and find that the productivity of 
target firms’ plants declines substantially during the two years prior to the 
intervention and then rebounds sharply during the two years afterward.89 
Furthermore, underperforming plants sold after the activist intervention 
experience a substantial increase in productivity and profitability in the 
hands of the new owners.90 These results indicate that activists are skilled at 
efficiently reallocating corporate assets. 
Contrary to the proposition that the value created by activism derives 
from increased operating performance, Greenwood and Schor find in their 
sample of activist interventions in the United States from 1993–2006 that 
announcement returns to activism are significant, mainly in instances where 
the target is acquired within eighteen months of the initial intervention.91 As 
a result, they argue that the positive average abnormal returns reflect the 
market’s expectation that the activist will put the firm in play and succeed 
in getting the target acquired at a premium to the current stock price.92 
Thus, the real skill of activists lies in brokering deals. The evidence should 
not be viewed negatively and should take into account the gains reaped by 
target shareholders from selling at a premium to the market price and the 
tendency of target management to resist a takeover.93 
Activists are also increasingly successful in pushing for governance 
changes in target companies. With the support of institutional investors, 
hedge funds in the United States are increasingly agitating for the 
                                                                                                                                
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Alon Brav et al., The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Risk and Product 
Market Competition 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17517, 2011), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17517.pdf. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Greenwood & Schor, supra note 81, at 368–70. 
 92. Id. at 363. 
 93. A prominent example was Yahoo’s rejection of Microsoft’s hostile bid at a substantial 
premium in 2008 under the leadership of Yahoo’s co-founder and then-imperial CEO, Jerry Yang. 
Activist Carl Icahn pressured Yahoo to accept the offer under the threat of a proxy fight. Although 
the deal collapsed, Icahn and another hedge fund investor, Daniel Loeb, agitated for governance 
changes in Yahoo, including the resignation of Jerry Yang from the board of Yahoo and any 
executive position with the company. See STEVEN DAVIDOFF, GODS AT WAR: SHOTGUN 
TAKEOVERS, GOVERNMENT BY DEAL, AND THE PRIVATE EQUITY IMPLOSION 187–95 (2009); 
Amir Efrati et al., Founder Severs Ties to Yahoo, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204555904577167251792053494.html. 
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dismantling of takeover defenses or their subjection to a shareholder vote.94 
Furthermore, in their studies of activist engagements, Klein and Zur, as well 
as Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas, find increases in leverage and the 
payout ratio in target firms following the activist intervention, indicating 
that hedge funds ameliorate the agency problem of free cash flow. 95 
Additionally, hedge fund activism is associated with an increase in CEO 
turnover rate and pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation.96 
B.  THE DARK SIDE OF HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM 
Critics of hedge fund activism view hedge funds as short-term 
speculators who agitate for changes that will earn them a quick profit at the 
expense of long-term value.97 Holding their shares for a short time period, 
so the argument goes, hedge funds are able to exit their investments at a 
profit long before the negative consequences of their actions have 
materialized, leaving employees and long-term shareholders worse off.98 As 
Leo Strine has observed, activists “can easily depart and not eat their own 
cooking.”99 Thus, activists exacerbate short-termism in financial markets, 
which are increasingly dominated by short-term investors in search of quick 
returns.100 
                                                                                                                                
 94. Various studies have associated takeover defenses with lower firm value. See Lucian 
Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409 (2005); Lucian 
A. Bebchuk et al., Staggered Boards and the Wealth of Shareholders: Evidence from Two Natural 
Experiments (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17127, 2011), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17127.pdf (finding that staggered boards lead to lower firm value). 
See also Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783 
(2009) (constructing an entrenchment index consisting of six provisions, including the adoption of 
a staggered board and poison pill, and concluding that the entrenching provisions are correlated 
with lower firm value). However, one should note that these studies do not prove a direct 
causation between takeover defenses and lower firm value. Indeed, takeover defenses are 
beneficial in cases where management can negotiate a better deal for shareholders as a result of its 
increased negotiating power and has strong reasons to believe that the long-term value of the 
company is higher than the current value placed by the bidder. A recent example was Airgas’s 
strong resistance against Airproduct’s hostile bid. After Airproduct withdrew its offer, Airgas saw 
a substantial increase in its stock price, indicating that management’s belief that Airproduct’s offer 
was undervaluing the company was correct. See Steven Davidoff, Winners & Losers in the Airgas 
Poison Pill Case, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 26, 2011, 12:44 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/02/16/who-won-in-the-airgas-poison-pill-case/. 
 95. See Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, 
supra note 41, at 1770–73; Klein & Zur, supra note 81, at 222–25. 
 96. See Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, 
supra note 41, at 1776. 
 97. See Lipton, supra note 14. 
 98. Millstein, supra note 17; Sorkin, supra note 17. 
 99. See Strine, supra note 18, at 8. 
 100. See Rebecca Darr & Judith Samuelson, Overcoming Short-Termism: A Call for a More 
Responsible Approach to Investment and Business Management, ASPEN INST., 2–3 (Sept. 9, 
2009), 
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/bsp/overcome_short_state0909.pdf. 
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However, as noted above, in their empirical study of hedge fund 
interventions, Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang find that contrary to claims that 
activism is harmful for long-term firm value, activists are able to create 
sustainable, long-term improvements in the company’s share price and 
operational performance.101 What is crucial to understand is that activist 
hedge funds are not controlling shareholders able to impose their desired 
changes in the company’s strategy or governance, but rather large 
influential shareholders who invest in monitoring and proposing value-
enhancing changes to other shareholders. 102  The shareholders on whose 
support hedge funds count to implement their agenda are traditional 
institutional investors—predominantly mutual funds and pension funds with 
long-term investment horizons that hold shares for a long period of time.103 
Although mutual funds and pensions are reluctant to engage in activism, 
they are increasingly adopting transparent voting policies and scrutinizing 
proposals submitted for a vote. 104 What is more, the popular belief that 
hedge fund activists are short-term investors holding stocks for a short 
period of time does not correspond to reality. Indeed, Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, 
and Thomas find an average holding period of twenty-two months for 
activists targeting U.S. companies,105 while Becht, Franks, and Grant report 
                                                                                                                                
 101. See Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Activism, supra note 81. 
 102. Indeed, Bebchuk, Brav, Jackson, and Jiang document that the average activist stake 
reaches 8.8%, with a median of 6.3%. See Bebcuk et al., supra note 44. Although the stake is large 
enough to incentivize the activist to engage in activism, it is too small to guarantee the activist’s 
prevalence in a proxy fight or the adoption of shareholder proposals submitted by him or her. This 
is also true in cases where the activists seek to discipline a controlling shareholder. In order to 
counteract the power of the controlling shareholder, the activists will often cooperate with other 
shareholders. See, e.g., Belcredi & Enriques, supra note 80, at 22–31. 
 103. Despite the popular perception of ever-increasing turnover rates and diminishing holding 
durations of equities, empirical evidence suggest that these changes are driven by a small subset of 
hyperactive traders such as high-frequency traders. See Mark Roe, Corporate Short-Termism—In 
the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 BUS. LAW. 977 (2013). Indeed, Cremers, Pareek, and 
Sautner find that institutional investor holding durations from 1985 until 2010 have in fact 
increased over time from 1.2 years in 1985 to 1.5 years in 2010, with pension funds having the 
longest duration, reaching approximately 1.7 years. See Martin Cremers et al., Stock Duration and 
Misvaluation (Sept. 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=2190437. 
 104. See Toonkel & Kim, supra note 4. The shift in the way that institutional investors cast their 
votes became evident when Lawrence Fink, the co-founder and CEO of Blackrock, the world’s 
largest asset manager and one of the biggest shareholders of U.S. companies, wrote a letter to all 
U.S. companies in which Blackrock was a shareholder. He warned the companies that they should 
not assume that Blackrock was following the recommendations of proxy advisory firms blindly, 
but rather was reaching its voting decisions on the basis of clear guidelines and its fiduciary 
responsibilities to its investors. Susanne Craig, The Giant of Shareholders, Quietly Stirring, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/business/blackrock-a-shareholding-
giant-is-quietly-stirring.html. 
 105. See Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, 
supra note 41, at 1749. 
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an average holding period of 645 days (approximately twenty-one months) 
for their sample of activist interventions in Europe.106 
Activist investors have also been creative in exploiting the gaps of 
disclosure regimes, accumulating stakes secretly in target companies and 
decoupling risk and equity. Current reporting rules in the United States and 
Europe provide a shareholder who has crossed a certain threshold triggering 
a disclosure obligation a certain time period before it is required to 
announce its presence to the issuer and the market. 107 During this time 
period and before any public disclosure is made, a shareholder can continue 
accumulating shares—amazingly often an influential stake.108 A prominent 
example was Pershing Square Capital Management’s and Vornado Realty 
Trust’s activist intervention in J.C. Penney Company, the U.S. retailer. 
Following Pershing Square’s acquisition of an initial stake of 4.9%, 
Pershing Square and Vornado Realty Trust amassed a stake reaching 26.7% 
through a series of rapid purchases during the ten-day window after 
crossing the 5% threshold and before disclosing their presence to the market 
by filing a Schedule 13D.109 Taking into account that the disclosure of an 
activist’s presence leads to an immediate price spike, an activist has a 
strong incentive to exploit the reporting lag and acquire additional shares at 
depressed prices, which do not yet reflect information about the activist’s 
presence and intentions. For instance, from September 28, 2010, when it 
first crossed the 5% threshold until October 7, 2010, when it filed a 
Schedule 13D, Pershing Square was able to acquire J.C. Penney shares at an 
average price of $29.27, well below the post-disclosure closing price of 
$33.30, earning a profit of $193 million.110 
Furthermore, innovations in the derivatives market have revolutionized 
activist investing, allowing hedge funds to sever the link between share 
ownership and economic interest. Hedge fund activists utilize a variety of 
cash-settled derivatives instruments to increase their economic ownership, 
decoupling it from voting power, with one of the most popular being the 
use of cash-settled total return equity swaps.111 A cash-settled total return 
equity swap is a derivative contract that replicates the cash flows of an 
                                                                                                                                
 106. See Bebchuk et al. supra note 44, at 10 tbl.2. 
 107. See infra notes 142–144 and accompanying text. 
 108. Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, supra note 21. 
 109. See Maxwell Murphy, How Bill Ackman Stalked J.C. Penney, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 8, 2010), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/10/08/how-bill-ackman-stalked-jc-penney/. 
 110. See Joshua Mitts, A Private Ordering Solution to Blockholder Disclosure, 35 N.C. CENT. 
L. REV. 203, 213 (2013). 
 111. Other strategies include the use of cash-settled call and put options and single-stock 
futures. For an overview of the various strategies, see Hu & Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty 
Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, supra note 20, at 814–48; Wolf-Georg Ringe, Hedge 
Funds and Risk Decoupling: The Empty Voting Problem in the European Union, 38 SEATTLE U. 
L. REV. 1027, 1034–38 (2013). 
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investment in shares of a company.112 In a typical swap, the long party 
receives the economic returns on a notional amount of shares by the short 
party without actually holding them. 113  More specifically, when the 
transaction is wound up, the long party is entitled to receive any cash 
distributions such as dividends on the referenced shares, plus a cash amount 
equal to the market appreciation of the shares.114 The short party on its side 
is entitled to receive an amount equal to any depreciation in the market 
value of the shares and a negotiated interest rate, as if it had loaned the 
notional amount.115 
As a result, the long party obtains economic exposure to the reference 
shares without formal ownership.116 Importantly, the long party may also 
have informal voting rights.117 The short party, usually an investment bank 
that seeks to obtain a return from the interest charged on the notional 
amount of shares, will typically hedge its exposure by buying the 
referenced shares.118 Holding voting rights, but with no economic exposure, 
the short party interested in maintaining a profitable business relationship 
has an incentive to cast its vote in support of its client. Furthermore, the 
parties may decide to physically settle the swap with the long party, 
immediately acquiring the underlying shares from its short counterparties 
                                                                                                                                
 112. For an excellent and accurate description of total-return equity swaps, see CSX Corp. v. 
Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). TCI and 3G 
are two hedge funds that secretly accumulated positions in CSX through the use of total equity 
return swaps and direct investments, launching a proxy fight against the incumbent directors of 
CSX. Id. at 518. CSX filed suit, seeking to prevent the funds from voting the shares acquired and 
arguing that TCI and 3G were obliged to disclose their positions and therefore violated the 
requirements of section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act. Id. at 538. The U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of New York deemed TCI to be a beneficial owner of the shares held by 
its counterparties according to section 13(d)(3) and on the basis that it had used the swaps in order 
to evade the reporting requirements. Furthermore, the court held that TCI and 3G had formed a 
group and had failed to disclose their positions ordering them to amend their Schedule 13D filing. 
Id. at 573–74. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit declined to issue a 
ruling on the issue of whether equity swaps are included in the definition of beneficial ownership 
of section 13d(1) and focused on the issue of whether the funds had formed a group under section 
13d-3. The court held that more evidence than meetings between the funds alone was required and 
remanded the case to the lower court for more evidence-taking. CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. 
Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 654 F.3d 276, 309–10 (2d Cir. 2011); see also Ian Cuillerier & Claire 
Hall, CSX Corp. v. Children’s Investment Fund Management (UK) LLP: Disclosure 
Requirements in the Context of Total Return Swaps, 31 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP. (2011), 
available at http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/8643ad76-fdff-4403-85e1-3f08a3c6e9f8 
/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/91edabe3-e0ad-4edb-aca1-4639138f7ca1/alerts-TRS-
Disclosure-Requirements-CSX-Corp.pdf. 
 113. See CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 519–20. 
 114. Id. at 520. 
 115. Id. at 521. 
 116. See Hu & Black, Hedge Funds, Insiders and the Decoupling of Economic and Voting 
Ownership: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, supra note 20, at 344. 
 117. See CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 522. 
 118. See id. at 521–22. 
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and therefore emerging as a major blockholder. 119 Until recently, major 
jurisdictions did not require the long party to disclose its economic interest. 
Although European regulators have amended their disclosure rules in 
response to market innovations, 120  cash-settled derivatives still escape 
disclosure requirements in the United States.121 
While the empirical evidence strongly indicates that hedge fund 
activists are not short-term speculators seeking quick gains at the expense 
of long-term value, the ability of activists to accumulate large stakes either 
through exploiting pre-disclosure windows or entering into derivatives 
transactions clearly undermine market transparency and fairness.122 Indeed, 
the purpose of disclosure rules for major shareholders “is to alert the 
marketplace to every large, rapid aggregation or accumulation of 
securities.”123 
Mandatory disclosure rules seek to promote market efficiency and 
improve the corporate governance of companies.124 The improvements in 
market efficiency flow from the increased transparency of the voting 
structure and capital movements. 125  Pre-disclosure accumulations and 
hidden ownership reduce transparency of the voting structure and changes 
in it. The accumulation of shares by short counterparties results in the 
shares being held by a party with no economic exposure to the issuer but 
the incentive to cast the votes in accordance with the preferences of the long 
party.126 Furthermore, the exploitation of pre-disclosure windows and the 
use of cash-settled equity derivatives to build control-threatening stakes 
leave the market uninformed of changes in the voting structure. 127  In 
addition, these tactics compromise the transparency of trading interest and 
the amount of shares that are in the free float. The heightened interest in the 
shares remains undisclosed to market participants, while the market may                                                                                                                                 
 119. See Hu & Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and 
Extensions, supra note 20, at 661–81 (reporting instances of decoupling of economic and voting 
ownership where derivatives have been used in order to secretly build a stake in a target 
company); Dionysia Katelouzou, Myths and Realities of Hedge Fund Activism: Some Empirical 
Evidence, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 460 (2013) (reporting thirteen instances of “hidden ownership” in 
a sample of 432 activist campaigns outside the United States between January 1, 2010, and 
December 31, 2010). 
 120. See infra notes 137–145 and accompanying text. 
 121. See infra note 167.  
 122. Adam O. Emmerich et al., Fair Markets and Fair Disclosure: Some Thoughts on the Law 
and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, and the Use and Abuse of Shareholder Power, 3 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 136, 136 (2013). 
 123. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 124. Michael C. Schouten, The Case for Mandatory Ownership Disclosure, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. 
& FIN. 127, 133 (2009); see also EILIS FERRAN, BUILDING AN EU SECURITIES MARKET 127–30 
(2004). 
 125. Schouten, supra note 124, at 166. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Maiju Kettunen & Wolf-George Ringe, Disclosure Regulation of Cash-Settled Equity 
Derivatives—An Intensions-Based Approach, 2012 LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 227, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1844886. 
2014] Hedge Fund Activism Coming to Europe 459 
also hold a distorted view of the size of the free float.128 Furthermore, in the 
case of hidden ownership, the marketplace is unable to assess the 
implications of the long party’s increased economic interest relative to its 
voting rights.129 
Apart from undermining market efficiency, pre-disclosure 
accumulations during the window left open by disclosure rules and hidden 
ownership also have adverse effects on the corporate governance of 
companies. 130  Ownership disclosure improves corporate governance by 
facilitating market control. Transparency of major holdings allows a 
potential acquirer to analyze the size of the free float and persons in control 
of the company, as well as identify shareholders with whom the bidder 
could cooperate. 131  Furthermore, disclosure of blockholders alerts other 
potential bidders that a third party is building a control-threatening stake 
and therefore promotes competitive auctions.132 In addition, the ability of 
activists to amass controlling blocks through derivatives and pre-disclosure 
accumulations allows them to capture the premium associated with 
corporate control without sharing it with their fellow shareholders.133 If an                                                                                                                                 
 128. A prominent example was Porsche’s surprise announcement that it had acquired 42.6% of 
the stock of Volkswagen and had access to another 31% through cash-settled options. Taking into 
account the stake of the German state of Lower Saxony, which amounted to another 20%, the size 
of the free float had been reduced to approximately 6%. Hedge funds that were borrowing shares 
and selling them short (around 12.8% of Volkswagen’s shares were on loan) immediately rushed 
to buy Volkswagen stock in order to close their positions, sending the shares soaring and making 
Volkswagen the most valuable company in the world. See Sarah Marsh, Short Sellers Make VW 
the World’s Priciest Firm, REUTERS (Oct. 28, 2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/10/28 
/us-volkswagen-idUSTRE49R3I920081028. 
 129. As Gilson and Gordon note, the long party’s increased economic exposure relative to its 
voting leverage reduces the possibility of opportunistic behavior and private benefit extraction by 
the activist. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 25, at 913. However, the increased economic 
interest of the long party may still distort optimal decision-making since the party may be more 
risk-averse compared to a shareholder whose economic and voting interests are perfectly aligned. 
As a result, the disproportionality between economic and voting interests may influence the firm’s 
future cash flows and would therefore be considered as fundamental information by the market. 
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 
403 (1983); Schouten, supra note 124, at 168. 
 130. See Schouten, supra note 124, at 168. 
 131. Id. at 154. 
 132. Kettunen & Ringe, supra note 127, at 15. 
 133. For an overview of specific instances where activists have used these tactics to acquire 
controlling blocks and launch stealth takeovers, see Pierre Henry Conac, Cash-Settled Derivatives 
as a Takeover Instrument and the Reform of the EU Transparency Directive, in THE EUROPEAN 
FINANCIAL MARKET IN TRANSITION 49–68 (Hanne S. Birkmose et al. eds., 2012); Hu & Black, 
Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions, supra note 20, at 
655–81. However, one should note that activists rarely seek to take control of the target 
companies, with their average stake reaching 8.8%, their median only 6.3%, and the ninety-fifth 
percentile being 21.2%. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 44, at 12. The claims that shareholders in 
such instances who sell to the activist before disclosure of the stake and without any information 
about its existence or its plans are deprived of a control premium are inaccurate. It is evident that 
the activist is not seeking to obtain control, which will permit it to obtain private benefits of 
control not shared by the other shareholders. See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 23, at 51–52. 
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activist who has acquired a controlling stake decides to launch a takeover 
offer, minority shareholders may be pressured to tender their shares out of 
fear that they will be left as minority shareholders in a company under the 
control of a new shareholder.134 
III.  THE CURRENT REGULATION OF DISCLOSURE OF MAJOR 
SHAREHOLDINGS IN THE EU: REFRAMING THE DEBATE 
A.  THE CURRENT REGULATION OF DISCLOSURE OF MAJOR 
SHAREHOLDINGS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Disclosure of major shareholdings in EU companies whose shares are 
admitted to trading in a regulated market is governed by the Transparency 
Directive. 135  The Directive significantly upgraded the earlier Substantial 
Shareholdings Directive, which required a shareholder whose voting rights 
reached 10%, 20%, one-third, 50%, and two-thirds of total voting rights to 
disclose its interest to the company and the competent authority within 
seven calendar days following the acquisition.136 
Following calls for more effective and timely disclosure of the structure 
of influence in a company, 137  the Transparency Directive substantially 
lowered the notification thresholds, shortened the timeframe within which 
the disclosure must be made, and included certain derivatives in the 
notification requirements. Article 9(1) imposes on shareholders whose 
voting rights reach or exceed 5% the obligation to notify the company of 
the acquisition within four trading days.138 The disclosure requirements are 
extended to financial instruments that grant the holder under a formal 
agreement and on its own initiative the right to acquire shares to which 
voting rights are attached to an issuer admitted to trade on a regulated 
market.139 As a result, cash-settled derivatives, including total return swaps 
that do not grant the long party the right to purchase shares, did not fall 
within the ambit of the Transparency Directive until the recent 
amendments. 
The minimum harmonization model adopted by the Directive allows 
EU Member States to introduce more stringent requirements. 140  In                                                                                                                                 
 134. Kettunen & Ringe, supra note 127, at 15. 
 135. Transparency Directive, supra note 24. 
 136. Council Directive 88/627/EEC, of the Council of 12 December 1988 on the Information to 
be Published when a Major Holding in a Listed Company Is Acquired or Disposed Of, art. 4(1), 
1988 O.J. (L 348) 62, 63. 
 137. NIAHM MOLONEY, EC SECURITIES REGULATION 195 (2008). 
 138. Transparency Directive, supra note 24, art. 9(1), at 38, 47. The issuer must subsequently 
disclose this information to the public within three trading days. Id. art. 12(6). 
 139. Id. art. 13(1). 
 140. Member States are free to determine the content of the notification, with some Member 
States mandating a declaration of intentions by the shareholder crossing the threshold. For 
instance, France requires any shareholder whose ownership interest exceeds 10%, 15%, 20%, or 
25% of the shares or voting rights of an issuer to file a declaration of intent with the French 
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implementing the Transparency Directive, several Member States opted for 
lower disclosure thresholds and shorter notification deadlines. 141  The 
United Kingdom requires disclosure of acquisitions above 3% of shares 
carrying voting rights in issuers incorporated in the United Kingdom and 
admitted to trading on a European Economic Area (EEA)-regulated market 
within two trading days. 142 Similarly, Germany and France mandate the 
disclosure of shareholdings exceeding 3% and 5% of voting rights 
respectively within four trading days.143 Disclosure of acquisitions above 
3% in Spain must be made within four trading days. 144  Following the 
outrage provoked by the use of cash-settled derivatives to secretly acquire 
controlling stakes in European companies, 145  the majority of European 
jurisdictions extended their disclosure requirements to cash-settled 
derivatives, including total return swaps not captured by the Transparency 
Directive until its recent amendment. 
The United Kingdom’s modified disclosure rules include financial 
instruments referenced to the issuer’s shares and granting the holder a long                                                                                                                                 
regulator, describing its intentions with respect to the issuer in the six-month period following 
notification. It must describe whether the shareholder intends to purchase additional securities, 
gain corporate control, or request the appointment of directors. It must also disclose any strategic 
plans with respect to the issuer such as a merger, reorganization, or liquidation or a transfer of 
material assets. See CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] art. L.233-7(VII) (Fr.), available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?idArticle=LEGIARTI000022963037&cidTex
te=LEGITEXT000005634379; Autorité Marchés Financiers, Règlement general art. 223-17(I)(2) 
(2012). Rules imposing extensive reporting requirements regarding the intentions of a blockholder 
are criticized for exposing the shareholder to considerable liability risk and carrying substantial 
enforcement risk since misrepresentations regarding one’s intentions are difficult to detect and 
prosecute. See Luca Enriques et al., Mandatory and Contract-Based Shareholding Disclosure, 15 
REVUE DE DROIT UNIFORME 713, 717 (2010).  
 141. For an extensive overview of disclosure thresholds and notification deadlines in the 
European Union, see FABRICE DEMARIGNY & CHRISTOPHE CLERC, TRANSPARENCY DIRECTIVE 
ASSESSMENT REPORT 112 (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs 
/transparency/report-application_en.pdf; Andrew Hougie et al., Implementation of the 
Transparency Directive Changes Shareholder Notification Requirements Across Europe, 8 J. 
INVESTMENT COMPLIANCE 63 (2007). 
 142. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., DISCLOSURE RULES AND TRANSPARENCY RULES paras. 5.1.1, 
5.1.2 (2014), available at http://media.fshandbook.info/content/full/DTR.pdf. 
 143. C. COM. art. L.233-7; Wertpapierhandelsgesetz [WpHG] [Securities Trading Act], BGBL. I 
at 2708, last amended by Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie 2010/73/EU und zur Änderung des 
Börsengesetzes, Aug. 28, 2013, BGBL. I at 3395, § 21 (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/bundesrecht/wphg/gesamt.pdf. 
 144. Transparency Requirements art. XXXV (B.O.E. 2007, 18305) (Spain), available at 
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2007/10/20/pdfs/A42692-42708.pdf. 
 145. Ed Crooks, Enel Wants Regulator to Speed Up Bid for Endesa, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2007, 
at 27, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/17d74434-dd6f-11db-8d42-000b5df10621.html 
#axzz2ieQI8dix; Haig Simonia, Victory Jitters Strike Swiss Industrialists, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 19, 
2007, at 24, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/38f9fb00-d5bf-11db-a5c6-000b5df10621 
.html#axzz2ieQI8dix; Sarah Spikes, Funds’ Battle with Stork Heats Up, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 24, 
2006, at 24, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/de36673e-7b60-11db-bf9b-
0000779e2340.html#axzz2ieQI8dix; Oscar Bodini & Giovanni Legorano, Italian Court Finds 
Agnelli’s Advisers Guilty of Market Rigging, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 21, 2013, 9:51 AM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20130221-709691.html. 
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position on the economic performance of the shares, whether the instrument 
is settled physically in shares or in cash.146 Holdings of these instruments 
are aggregated with any holdings of voting shares in calculating whether the 
3% disclosure threshold has been reached.147 Similarly, Germany extended 
its disclosure requirements to financial instruments or other instruments that 
merely enable the holder to acquire voting rights. 148  The notification 
threshold is set at 5%, and holdings of financial instruments that enable the 
holder to acquire voting rights must be aggregated with voting shares and 
instruments giving rights to acquire shares.149 Finally, France also amended 
its disclosure rules, mandating the inclusion of any holdings of financial 
instruments settled in cash and having for the holder an economic effect 
similar to the possession of shares for the purpose of calculating whether 
the 5% threshold has been reached.150 
Furthermore, on October 22, 2013, European regulators adopted 
amendments to the Transparency Directive.151 The amendments specifically 
target the widespread use of financial instruments, giving investors 
economic exposure to companies and allowing them to acquire secret stakes 
in companies resulting in market abuse.152 Pursuant to the amendments to 
the Directive, EU Member States must extend their notification 
requirements to financial instruments with economic effects similar to                                                                                                                                 
 146. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 142, paras. 5.3.3–.4, 5.8.3. 
 147. Id. para. 5.8.2(4). Disclosure is made by reference to the delta of the financial instrument 
and not the full notional of shares underlying the financial instrument. “Delta” refers to the 
number of shares that the writer of an option must hold in order to perfectly hedge its position and 
changes over time as the option moves closer to expiration and the price of the referenced shares 
varies. The New FSA Rules on Disclosure of Interests in UK Companies, LINKLATERS, 3 (May 
2009), http://www.linklaters.com/pdfs/publications/capitalmarkets/CFD_disclosurerulesnote.pdf. 
 148. Securities Trading Act, supra note 143, § 25a. An instrument enables an investor to 
acquire voting rights if the counterparty can exclude or lower risk emanating from these 
instruments by buying the referenced shares, irrespective of whether the instrument provides for a 
cash or physical settlement. 
 149. Id. The number of voting rights is determined by the amount of shares that the 
counterparty would need to hold for a full hedge of its position, assuming a delta of one. 
 150. CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] arts. L.233-7, -9 (Fr.); France Adopts New Aggregation 
Rules, BAKER & MCKENZIE (Oct. 2012), http://www.bakermckenzie.com/files/Publication 
/a07004fa-ab21-4cd4-ac43-147cdebc9cb7/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/53fc8fc6-99e7-
452f-929e-871c68df248d/al_bf_fanceaggregationrules_oct12.pdf. The number of voting rights to 
be disclosed is calculated on a delta-adjusted basis. See C. COM. art. L.233-11. Furthermore, 
following amendments to the French Commercial Code in 2012, a shareholder whose ownership 
interest exceeds 10%, 15%, 20%, or 25% of the shares or voting rights of an issuer as a result of 
the use of total return swaps or other cash-settled derivatives must report whether it intends to 
acquire the shares bought by its counterparties in order to hedge their short positions or to alter its 
agreement with its counterparties and settle the initially cash-settled derivatives in-kind. See id. 
art. 233-7(VII)(e).  
 151. Transparency Directive Amendments, supra note 24. The Directive imposes an obligation 
on all Member States to aggregate holdings of voting rights with holdings of financial instruments 
in calculating notifiable interests. Although the Directive still allows Member States to set lower 
notification thresholds than the minimum thresholds it introduced, they will not be able to impose 
different requirements regarding the calculation of aggregation of interests. Id. at 15. 
 152. Id. at 21. 
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instruments that give the holder the right to acquire voting shares, whether 
they are physically settled or not.153 Holdings of financial instruments must 
be aggregated with holdings of voting shares in order to determine whether 
the disclosure threshold has been reached or exceeded.154 Furthermore, the 
amendments to the Directive provide that long positions cannot be netted 
with short positions in the same issuer.155 
B.  REFRAMING THE DEBATE 
The rules governing disclosure of major shareholdings—both at the 
level of individual European countries and at the EU level, including the 
recent amendments to the Transparency Directive—respond to the 
innovative and opaque tactics of hedge fund activists and serve the 
legitimate purpose of safeguarding market transparency and fairness. 
Nonetheless, they fail to balance the costs imposed by hedge fund activists 
in terms of compromising market transparency with the benefits of activism 
for shareholders and companies. Current disclosure rules unfavorably tilt 
the balance of power between management and activists against the latter 
and have a chilling effect on hedge fund activism in Europe that 
substantially lags behind the United States.156 
The emergence of an activist, the size of its block, and its investments 
in monitoring depend on its ability to recover its costs and earn an 
attractive, risk-adjusted return on its investment. 157  For the activist, an 
intervention entails high expenditures on research, increased idiosyncratic 
risk arising from its concentrated and illiquid position, and costs associated 
with an activist campaign, including costs incurred in connection with a 
proxy fight. 158  Furthermore, increased competition between hedge funds 
employing different strategies and asset classes for attracting funds requires 
activists to offer an attractive return to their investors. 
The ability of an activist to recoup its costs and earn a profit on its 
investment depends on securing a sizeable stake at prices that do not reflect                                                                                                                                 
 153. Id. at 22. The number of voting rights is calculated by reference to the notional amount of 
shares underlying the financial instrument unless the financial instrument is cash-settled, in which 
case the calculation of the voting rights shall be made on a delta-adjusted basis. The notional 
amount of the underlying shares shall be multiplied by the delta of the instrument. 
 154. Id. at 23. 
 155. Id. at 22. 
 156. See Georgina Prodhan & Angelika Gruber, Lonely Activist Investor Pushes Limits in 
Austria, REUTERS (Sept. 6, 2013), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/09/06/austria-investment-
activist-idUKL6N0GZ2AA20130906 (reporting that while the number of activist campaigns in 
the United States has reached 357, only twenty-six have been recorded at European companies). 
 157. See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 23, at 49. 
 158. Gantchev estimates that the costs of an average activist campaign composed of three 
separate stages—demand negotiations, board representation, and proxy contest—equal $10.71 
million. The proxy contest—involving legal fees, fees of proxy solicitors, and public relations and 
advertising expenditures—has the highest cost, reaching $5.94 million. See Gantchev, supra note 
55, at 624. 
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the expected benefits of the activist’s intervention.159 Upon disclosure of an 
activist’s presence, share prices rise, reflecting the expected value of 
increased monitoring and engagement with the target company. 160 
Acquiring a sizeable stake allows an activist to capture an increased fraction 
of the gains resulting from the stock price appreciation. One should stress 
that the activist captures only a fraction of the gains, with the rest of the 
gains accruing to other shareholders. 
Disclosure rules are crucial for the activist’s ability to recoup its costs 
and earn a return on its investments. A low disclosure threshold and a short 
period of time for disclosure after the ownership threshold has been reached 
reduce the size of the stake that an activist can accumulate before disclosure 
drives up the share price and eliminates the activist’s gains. 161  As the 
returns of an activist depend on its ability to capture a sizeable proportion of 
the share price gains by acquiring a sufficiently large equity stake, reducing 
the size of the pre-disclosure block leads to a decrease in the activist’s 
returns. 162  Similarly, aggregating holdings of equity derivatives granting 
their holder economic exposure to the target company with voting rights for 
the purpose of determining the disclosure trigger further reduces the 
economic stake that an activist can amass.163 In some cases the activist will 
not be able to recoup its costs and earn a competitive return, therefore 
shunning activism altogether, while in other cases, even though the activist 
will be able to profit from its investment, its small block will make the 
threat of a successful intervention in the target company less credible. 
The abovementioned analysis has shown that the current disclosure 
regimes at the level of individual European countries—but also at the EU 
level—significantly impede activism, depriving shareholders of the superior 
returns documented upon the disclosure of an activist’s presence, and 
companies and the economy in general of the improvements in operating 
performance that activists are able to implement. Furthermore, by making 
activism more costly and less frequent, investors will lose the gains arising 
from the disciplinary effects of activism. The threat of the emergence of an 
                                                                                                                                
 159. See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 23, at 50; Gilson & Gordon, supra note 25, at 902; 
Andrei Shleifer & Robert. W. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. POL. 
ECON. 461 (1986). 
 160. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 25, at 903–04. 
 161. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 44, at 17–19; Gilson & Gordon, supra note 25, at 904–06. 
 162. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 25, at 904. 
 163. Equity derivatives such as total return swaps allow an activist to increase its economic 
exposure to the target and gain additional profits from a share price appreciation without 
increasing its voting rights. The gains of an activist derive from its ability to build an economic 
stake prior to disclosure of its position. Once disclosure of the activist’s economic stake is made, 
the share price will spike, reflecting the expected value of the intervention. Counting equity 
derivatives towards the disclosure threshold reduces the returns of the activist by reducing its 
economic stake. See id. at 914–15. 
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activist reduces agency costs by inducing management to improve share 
price and operational performance.164 
Gilson and Gordon argue that the genius of the recent campaign urging 
the SEC to shorten the time period for disclosure after the threshold has 
been reached and include derivatives in the calculation of the relevant 
disclosure threshold is the covert imposition of a low threshold poison pill 
at a time when shareholders are demanding the dismantling of poison 
pills.165 The regulatory cap on the activist’s ownership stake functions as a 
defensive mechanism against activists shielded from shareholder opposition 
and imposed on all corporations. Analyzed from this perspective, European 
disclosure requirements go even further and directly contravene the spirit 
and rationale of the Directive on Takeover Bids.166 In contrast to the United 
States, where the board is allowed to adopt defensive mechanisms without 
shareholder approval,167 defensive measures are banned in Europe unless 
the board obtains shareholder approval.168 In essence, European regulators 
have created a defensive mechanism targeting solely hedge fund activists.                                                                                                                                 
 164. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 44, at 20; see also Fos, supra note 1 (documenting that an 
increase in the likelihood of a proxy contest is associated with an increase in leverage, dividends, 
and CEO turnover at target companies and a decline in research and development, as well as 
capital expenditures and executive compensation. Taking into account that proxy contests are 
frequently launched by hedge fund activists, the evidence could be interpreted as confirming the 
disciplinary effects of hedge fund activism). 
 165. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 25, at 910–12. The poison pill is a popular defensive 
mechanism invented by Martin Lipton, a prominent U.S. corporate lawyer. Under the standard 
“flip in” pill, the board of directors, by board resolution and without shareholder approval, 
distributes rights to existing shareholders, which grant each rightsholder the right to buy additional 
shares in the target at a steep discount. The rights are exercisable once an acquirer has 
accumulated shares exceeding a specified ownership threshold (usually between ten and twenty 
percent). As a result, the triggering of a poison pill severely dilutes the acquirer’s stock ownership 
percentage in the target. See John Armour et al., The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes in 
Developed and Emerging Markets: An Analytic Framework, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 221, 245–47 
(2011). Poison pills are under attack by shareholders, with their number constantly falling during 
the last decade. In 2001, 2200 public corporations had poison pills in place. By 2011, fewer than 
900 public companies had adopted a poison pill. See Tonello, supra note 52. 
 166. Council Directive 2004/25/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 
2004 on Takeover Bids, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12. The Directive establishes a common framework for 
takeover bids in Europe, setting minimum requirements with which EU Member States must 
comply. 
 167. Defensive mechanisms in the United States are regulated by U.S. states and particularly 
state courts. Under Delaware law, in the preferred state of incorporation for the majority of large 
U.S. public companies, defensive mechanisms are reviewed under the Unocal standard. Under 
Unocal, the defensive actions must respond to a reasonable threat to corporate value and policy, 
and the defensive mechanisms must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed. Unocal Corp. v. 
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955–57 (Del. 1985); see Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 
A.2d 1361, 1373–89 (Del. 1995). 
 168. Council Directive 2004/25/EC, art. 9, 2004 O.J. (L 142), 12, 19. The ban against defensive 
mechanisms and the endorsement of the principle of shareholder choice in respect to takeovers 
demonstrate the recognition by European legislations of the beneficial effects of contests for 
corporate control. See JAAP WINTER ET AL., REPORT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY 
LAW EXPERTS ON ISSUES RELATED TO TAKEOVER BIDS (2002), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/takeoverbids/2002-01-hlg-report_en.pdf. 
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This defensive mechanism against activists significantly impedes 
shareholder activism in Europe and deprives shareholders and European 
companies of the gains stemming from activism. 
While the goal of safeguarding market transparency and fairness is a 
legitimate one for European regulators to pursue, a stringent disclosure 
regime comes at the cost of a reduction in the incidence of activism and its 
beneficial effects. The lowering of disclosure thresholds, tightening of the 
time period for disclosure, and the requirement to disclose economic 
interests acquired through derivatives were relatively straightforward 
exercises for European regulators. The compelling argument in favor of 
stringent disclosure rules for major shareholdings was that innovations in 
the marketplace had allowed activists to compromise market transparency 
by employing sophisticated techniques to quickly accumulate stakes in 
target companies. 169  Nonetheless, regulators in Europe have failed to 
recognize the beneficial effects of activism, the crucial role that disclosure 
rules play in incentivizing activists to engage with target companies, and 
the costs that tighter disclosure rules impose upon investors and companies 
who are deprived of the documented gains associated with activism.170 
The approach of European regulators can be contrasted with the recent 
debate between academics, practitioners, judges, and journalists sparked by 
a petition filed by a prominent U.S. law firm, urging the SEC to shorten the 
ten-day reporting lag after crossing section 13(d)’s five-percent disclosure 
threshold for major shareholdings to one business day following the 
                                                                                                                                
 169. See, e.g., FIN. SERVS. AUTH., NO. 07/20, DISCLOSURE OF CONTRACTS FOR DIFFERENCE: 
CONSULTATION AND DRAFT HANDBOOK TEXT ¶ 3.6–.7, at 21–22 (2007) (echoing these concerns, 
and specifically the ability of activists to accumulate secret stakes through derivatives). 
 170. See, e.g., Transparency Directive, supra note 24; see also Commission Directive 
2007/14/EC, 2007 O.J. (L 69/27); Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council Amending 2004/109/EC on the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation 
to Information About Issuers Whose Securities Are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market 
and Commission Directive 2007/14/EC, No. COM (2011) 683, at 12 (Oct. 25, 2011); 
Transparency Directive Amendments, supra note 24, at 14. Even though the initial proposal for 
amendments and the adopted amendments to the Transparency Directive explicitly mention that 
they have been adopted in response to activists’ innovative techniques enabling them to secretly 
accumulate stakes in companies, there is no mention of either the beneficial effects of activism or 
the costs of the tightened disclosure rules in terms of a reduction in the incidence of activism. 
Similarly, the impact assessment of the Transparency Directive quickly rejects the assertion that 
tightened disclosure requirements will chill hedge fund activism and the benefits associated with 
it, without engaging in any meaningful empirical analysis. See EUR. COMM’N, REPORT FROM THE 
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER: IMPACT ASSESSMENT 66–68 (2011), available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SEC:2011:1279:FIN:EN:PDF; see also 
FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 169, at 9 (showing where the British securities regulator engages 
in a cost-benefit analysis of its proposed rules for including derivatives in the calculation of the 
disclosure threshold). Nonetheless, it provides a rather superficial analysis of the costs of the 
tightened disclosure regime in terms of a reduction in the incidence of activism and the gains 
associated with it. 
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crossing and include derivatives in the definition of beneficial ownership.171 
Following the filing of the petition, the SEC is currently considering 
modifying the existing rules for outside blockholders pursuant to the 
authority granted to it by sections 766(e) and 929R of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.172 While proponents of the 
petition point to the abusive tactics of hedge fund activists and the 
destructive effects of activism for market transparency and fairness, 173 
opponents stress the beneficial effects of activism and the adverse effects 
that tighter disclosure rules will have on the incidence and size of activist 
blocks.174 Furthermore, opponents of the petition urge the SEC to conduct a 
careful policy analysis based on empirical evidence of the costs in terms of 
a reduction in activism and the benefits of modifying the current disclosure 
regime.175 
Nonetheless, the overhaul of European disclosure rules was not 
preceded by any policy analysis with academics and regulators, urging the 
tightening of disclosure obligations for major blockholders without 
recognizing their chilling effect on activism and the foregone profits for 
shareholders and companies. In light of the crucial role of disclosure 
obligations for activists and the adverse impact of current rules on hedge 
fund activism in Europe, European regulators should carefully reconsider 
the existing disclosure regime, both at the European and at an individual 
country level. The benefits of tighter disclosure rules in terms of improved 
market transparency and fairness must be weighed against the costs 
imposed on shareholders and companies as a result of a reduction in the 
incidences of activist activities.176 
On the one hand, European regulators with the contribution of 
European academics should conduct a careful, empirical analysis of the                                                                                                                                 
 171. See Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, supra note 21. Section 13(d)(1) of the Securities 
Exchange Act requires any person who acquires beneficial ownership of more than five percent of 
voting shares to file with the SEC within ten days after the acquisition a Schedule 13D. See 17 
C.F.R. § 240.13d-l (2014). A beneficial owner is any person who, directly or indirectly, through 
any contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship, or otherwise has the power to vote or 
direct the voting of the relevant securities or the power to dispose or direct the disposition of the 
securities. See id. § 240.13d-3. Derivatives are included in the calculation of the 13D disclosure 
threshold only if the holder has a right to beneficial ownership over the underlying security within 
sixty days. See id. § 240.13d-3(d)(1). 
 172. See Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, supra note 21; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 766(e), 929R, 124 Stat. 1376, 1797–99, 1866–
67 (2010). 
 173. See Emmerich et al., supra note 122; Beneficial Ownership, supra note 20; Andrew Ross 
Sorkin, Shareholder Democracy Can Mask Abuses, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 25, 2013), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/25/shareholder-democracy-can-mask-abuses/. 
 174. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 23; Bebchuk et al., supra note 44; Gilson & Gordon, 
supra note 25. One should note that, in contrast to our analysis, opponents of the petition regard 
the claims that activist tactics compromise market transparency and fairness as unfounded. See 
Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 23, at 51–55; Gilson & Gordon, supra note 25, at 913–15. 
 175. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 23, at 59–60. 
 176. Id. 
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frequency of large-scale accumulations of blocks by activist shareholders in 
the European Union through exploitation of pre-disclosure windows or use 
of derivatives, as well as the costs imposed by these activities. 177  One 
should note that the incidence of empty voting in the European Union may 
be actually overstated.178 On the other hand, they should empirically assess 
the benefits of activism for shareholders and companies in Europe and the 
costs of tighter disclosure obligations. The empirical analysis will lead to 
the adoption of more efficient disclosure obligations for major 
blockholders, which will on the one hand safeguard market transparency 
and on the other hand allow shareholders and companies to reap the gains 
associated with hedge fund activism. 
CONCLUSION 
The shareholder empowerment movement led by hedge fund activists 
has revolutionized modern capital markets and corporate governance. While 
activists are criticized as short-term agitators seeking to earn a quick profit, 
the empirical evidence univocally confirms the beneficial effects of 
activism for shareholders and companies. In response to the abusive tactics 
employed by activists seeking to secretly amass blockholdings in target 
companies and the adverse effects of such activism on market transparency 
and fairness, European regulators have tightened disclosure obligations for 
major shareholders. However, regulators in Europe have failed to recognize                                                                                                                                 
 177. One should note that in contrast with the United States, empirical research on the effects of 
hedge fund activism is still in its early stages. For empirical research concerning activism in 
Europe, see Bebchuk et al., supra note 44; Becht et al., Hedge Fund Activism in Europe, supra 
note 81; Becht et al., Returns to Shareholder Activism, supra note 81; Wolfgang Bessler et al., The 
Returns to Hedge Fund Activism in Germany, 20 EUR. FIN. MGMT. (forthcoming 2014) (finding 
that hedge fund activists in Germany increase shareholder value both in the short and the long 
term, and that aggressive activism is initially associated with higher returns that are quickly 
reversed); Erede, supra note 25 (analyzing hedge fund activism in the context of Italy and 
Germany, two corporate systems characterized by concentrated ownership); Peter Weber & Heinz 
Zimmermann, Hedge Fund Activism and Information Disclosure: The Case of Germany, 19 EUR. 
FIN. MGMT. 1017 (2013) (examining share price reactions upon disclosure of the presence of 
activists in Germany); Veronique Bessiere et al., Hedge Fund Activism: A Clinical Study of the 
French Company Atos Origin (July 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1635283 (examining the battle between hedge fund activists and the 
management of French company Atos Origin); Tilman H. Drerup, Much Ado About Nothing: The 
Effects of Hedge Fund Activism in Germany (Dec. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1718365 (examining a sample of 278 hedge fund shareholdings in 
German-listed companies, documenting positive stock market reactions upon disclosure of the 
presence of an activist that are subsequently reversed and finding no significant changes in central 
corporate variables such as cash holdings and leverage). 
 178. The European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA) launched a call for evidence in 2011 
seeking to collect information on the incidence of empty voting in the European Union and 
explore possible regulatory responses to the phenomenon. However, ESMA concluded that there 
was not sufficient evidence of empty voting in the European Union to warrant regulatory action. 
See EUR. SEC. & MKTS. AUTH., FEED-BACK STATEMENT: CALL FOR EVIDENCE ON EMPTY 
VOTING 4–5 (2012). 
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the crucial role of disclosure obligations in incentivizing activists to engage 
with target companies. Current disclosure regimes in Europe tilt the balance 
against activists, depriving shareholders and companies of the benefits 
emanating from activism. In line with calls by U.S. academics stressing the 
necessity of empirical analysis before proceeding with the tightening of 
disclosure obligations for major blockholders in the United States, the 
present Article urges European regulators to reconsider the current 
disclosure regime by conducting a careful, empirical analysis of their 
benefits for market transparency and fairness and their costs on 
shareholders and companies as a result of a reduction in the incidence of 
activist shareholdings. 
